Book Review--Lincoln and McClellan at War

Hearn, Chester G. Lincoln and McClellan at War. Baton Rouge, LSU Press. 2012. Index, notes, bibliography, 4 maps, 257 pages, 221 pages of text. ISBN 9780807145524, $45.

The  difficult relationship of Abraham Lincoln and George McClellan is certainly not a new one to readers of Civil War literature. Thus, while not breaking much new ground here, Chester Hearn has written an interesting and easy to read volume on the strained relationship between president and general.

What we have here are two people new to their commands. Lincoln was still a relatively inexperienced politician and McClellan, despite already being called the "Young Napoleon" in some circles, was new to leading an army this large. Of course McClellan might say leading an army this small but that's another issue.

Lincoln put his faith in McClellan to be able to end the war quickly. However Lincoln was unable to stay out of the way and McClellan bristled at what he considered to be the interference of Washington. In McClellan's eyes Lincoln was a gorilla and an unwelcome distraction. In Lincoln's eyes McClellan had a case of the "slows" and he even went so far as asking McClellan if he could borrow his army it he wasn't going to use it. The mutual distrust and sarcasm did not bode well for their relationship.

McClellan was a Unionist and certainly wanted to end the war however he and Lincoln had different strategies on how to do such. Lincoln wanted an aggressive general who would attack Robert E. Lee while McClellan preferred to be more cautious and fight a war of maneuvers. When Lincoln proposed a campaign to take the Rebel army located near Bull Run McClellan declined immediately and countered with what was to become the Peninsula Campaign. In traditional McClellan manner this was a slow and plodding campaign that while ultimately getting near Richmond did not achieve what McClellan had promised.

An area that is covered multiple times is the continued requesting of troops by McClellan. He consistently tells Washington he is out manned by the Confederate forces and promises to attack if only he had X number more troops. When the Secretary of War provided more men suddenly the Confederate army had even more. Whether McClellan actually believed the numbers provided by his spy Allan Pinkerton or if Pinkerton is providing numbers to prop up claims by McClellan is an interesting aspect to ponder. Of course Washington was on to McClellan and several times Lincoln called him on soldier counts.

After much back and forth McClellan was given what amounts to a final chance when the Confederate army went north of the Potomac in September 1862. The battle of Antietam gave McClellan a chance to inflict a large amount of damage on Robert E. Lee's troops. While certainly not a grand victory the major opportunity was lost when Union forces did not follow the damaged Confederates out of Maryland despite having fresh troops with which to carry on the battle. McClellan made what to him would be another blunder by calling the battle a Union victory. This proclamation gave Abraham Lincoln enough to go on in order to issue the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. McClellan, not being an abolitionist, despised that the war was turning into one of emancipation rather than reconciliation.

By November 1862 the president was left with few options and removed McClellan from command. It does appear though that Lincoln learned from his time with McClellan as future generals were not given the time and leeway that McClellan was.

While not a cut and dried book saying that McClellan was bad and Lincoln was good as is so often the case, the book does seem to come down harder on McClellan and his failings than it does on Lincoln and his inexperience. Time and research have shown this to be the correct assessment however.

Overall, this was an interesting and easy book to read. I would have liked to have seen a couple of more maps and maybe some illustrations throughout but that is just me. Really just a minor quibble in what is otherwise a fascinating read for anybody interested in the eastern theater of the Civil War. Recommended.

Thanks to LSU Press for sending a complimentary review copy.

Book Review--Yorktown's Civil War Siege

Quarstein, John V. and J. Michael Moore. Yorktown's Civil War Siege: Drums along the Warwick (Civil War Sesquicentennial) . The History Press, Charleston, SC. 2012. 192 pages, 156 pages of text, Index, bibliography, notes, order of battle, b/w photos, maps. ISBN 9781609496562, $19.99.

For most readers of Civil War history Union General George McClellan has a reputation for being overly cautious with his own troops and for grossly overestimating the size and strength of the Confederate troops he was to face. In many ways it would be these types of actions that led Abraham Lincoln to remove him from his position at the head of the Army of the Potomac after the Antietam campaign. While the Union army missed a great opportunity in September 1862 authors John Quarstein and J. Michael Moore argue that McClellan missed just as large an opportunity earlier in the same year. While McClellan may have been a good strategist he was not a good battle leader.

In April 1862 General McClellan began his plan to march down the peninsula from the key location of Fort Monroe in an attempt to take the Confederate capital of Richmond. Had he been successful there is a real possibility the war would have ended three years earlier than it ultimately did. Things were never this easy for Little Mac however as several obstacles, including his own fear of imagined Confederate manpower, stood in his way.

Despite having a dramatic four to one edge in manpower McClellan was fooled into thinking the Confederates were massing a large force by a simple but clever ruse by John Magruder. Magruder divided his forces and had them move continually along their line making it appear as though reinforcements were continually arriving.

Perhaps beyond McClellan's control but not helping him at all was the Union Navy and Flag Officer Louis Goldsborough's failure to provide support along the James and York rivers. While it is true that the Confederates had a new fighting force in the ironclad CSS Virginia the Union failure to actively engage and attempt to draw out this new ship caused this vital route to be unusable until the Confederate withdrawal toward Richmond.

In addition to his own timidity and the failure of the Navy McClellan did not have the best of intelligence nor were his maps accurate. These combined factors led McClellan to decide upon a siege of Yorktown at the spot of the great Revolutionary War siege. Confederate troops suffered tremendously during the siege due to the poor weather, limited rations and lack of health care.

The month long siege was ultimately going to be ended by a relentless pounding of the city by McClellan's massive array of artillery. Unfortunately for the Union army, and McClellan's reputation, the Confederate army slipped away just days before the planned bombardment thus saving the city. On the retreat toward Richmond several indecisive battles took place that further frustrated Abraham Lincoln.

The book contains a large number of b/w photos and several maps. An order of battle is included as is an interesting run down on Union artillery in the Peninsula Campaign. An extensive bibliography is available for those wanting further source material.